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This paper compares the organisation of the university sector under
private provision with the structure which would be chosen by a welfare
maximising government. It studies a general equilibrium model where
universities carry out research and teach students. To attend university
and earn higher incomes in the labour market, students pay a tuition fee.
Each university chooses its tuition fee to maximise the amount of resources
it can devote to research. Research bestows an externality on society
because it increases labour market earnings. Government intervention
needs to balance labour market eﬃciency considerations — which would
tend to equalise the number of students attending each university — with
considerations of eﬃciency on the production side, which suggest that the
most productive universities should teach more students and carry out
more research. We ﬁnd that government concentrates research more that
the private market would, but less than it would like to do if it had perfect
information about the productivity of universities. It also allows fewer
universities than would operate in a private system.
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This paper studies the optimal organisation of the university sector. Theoretical
analyses devoted to this topic are scarce, relative, for example, to public sector
procurement, health care, and primary and secondary school systems. This is
surprising, in view of the many peculiar features characterising the university
sector, its importance for society, and of course its immediate relevance to the
daily life of many researchers.
In the model of the paper, universities supply teaching and research. Stu-
dents attend university to increase their labour market earnings. They diﬀer in
the overall utility they derive from attending university. They have preferences
regarding which university they attend, for example because of mobility costs.
Universities are the only institutions which can impart tertiary education, and
their payoﬀ i st h ea m o u n to fr e s e a r c ht h a tt h e yd o .T h eg o v e r n m e n t 1 chooses
the funding of each university to maximise a standard utilitarian welfare func-
tion.
Government intervention may be justiﬁed by the externality bestowed on
society by university research, which aﬀects the residual of the production func-
tion (Solow 1957), and therefore individuals’ earnings. Our approach studies the
structure of the funding and therefore sits between the macroeconomic study
of the optimal aggregate amount of research and the microeconomic study of
the optimal internal organisation of each individual university (as studied by
Aghion et al 2008). In other words, we do not ask whether too much or too little
research is done, and concentrate instead on the distribution of a given amount
of total research and teaching among diﬀerent universities, under the assump-
tion that each individual university is carrying out its activities as eﬃciently as
its resources and technology permit.
The gist of our results can be summarized by stating that the unfettered
private market spreads research too thinly, and therefore the government would
like to concentrate research and teaching in the most productive universities.
This creates a tension. While the location of research is a matter of indiﬀerence,
and so there is no harm in concentrating it in few institutions, the students’
imperfect geographical mobility implies that the same is not true of teaching:
concentrating teaching in some institutions prevents some students from at-
tending university who would beneﬁt from doing so. The tension is between
concentrating teaching and research in the most productive universities only,
which is eﬃcient from the cost viewpoint, and ensuring that the students who
1We refer to the ﬁnancing or regulatory agency, as “the government”, although, conceivably,
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Figure 1: Concentration of research in Italy and in the UK.
beneﬁt most attend university, irrespective of their location, which is eﬃcient
from the beneﬁt viewpoint. This tension is due to the link between teaching and
research created by the university’s budget constraint: teaching raises tuition
fees and alumni donations with which universities fund their research. The gov-
ernment would like to sever this link. It, that is, would like to allocate the total
amount of research exclusively to the most productive institutions, to allocate
teaching according to the trade-oﬀ between beneﬁts and costs in teaching, and
to make all students contribute to research funding, including those taught at
universities where no research is done. The government is however unable to
do so unless it has perfect information about universities’ productivity. There-
fore the complementarity between teaching and research observed in practice
is explained in our model by the preferences of the suppliers and the need of
the government to provide incentives for universities to teach students, not by
ad hoc assumptions on the technological characteristics of the university pro-
duction function. As the universities have an information advantage vis-à-vis
the government, they use the funding mechanism to increase the amount of
research they do, and admit students only if there is a link with funding for re-
search. This corresponds to the unfettered private market, where their research
activities must be funded by tuition fees.
In practice, the structure of funding and organisational structure varies
2widely across diﬀerent university systems. As an example, Figure 1 shows the
very diﬀerent concentration of research funding in UK and in Italy, two countries
comparable in size and economic development. Research is clearly much more
concentrated in the UK.2 T h e s eh u g ed i ﬀerences call for a theoretical analysis
of the organisation of the sector, to identify desirable direction for reform and
explain diﬀerence in overall performance. Note that, while the UK system is
generally considered “better” than the Italian one, it is not necessarily the case
that concentration is per se preferable. It may aﬀect the number of universities
in the top 200 hundred in the Shanghai Jiao Tong University ranking (which
includes 22 of the 129 British and ﬁve of the 57 Italian universities), but if the
marginal cost of research is increasing, then concentration of funding may not
be the best structure, and it may be more eﬃcient instead to spread resources
across institutions.
Both in the UK and in Italy, like in the rest of Europe, universities are
government funded and regulated (for example in the tuition fees they can
charge) to a very considerable extent. US states have instead a substantial
private sector, alongside the state university system. Here as well we see a wide
range of patterns; Figure 2 plots a measure of research intensity (the share of
degrees awarded which are PhD’s) against the average size of universities in each
US state, both for the private sector and for the state university system. States
where universities are more research intensive tend also to have universities with
more students, and the eﬀect is clearly stronger in the public sector universities.
This pattern is in line with the optimal funding mechanism we derive here,
where the government ties research funding to the number of students enrolled.
In this way more productive universities receive more funding and teach more
students, and they do more research than they would in an the unfettered
private market.
We ﬁnd that the private and government designed systems diﬀer not just
in concentration of teaching and research, but also in the number and nature
of universities. There are fewer universities in the government designed system
than in an unfettered private system. While ﬁr s tb e s te ﬃciency requires “teach-
ing only” universities, the government is prevented in practice from establishing
them by its information disadvantage: the system it designs shares with that
emerging under unfettered private provision the feature that all universities do
both teaching and research. Finally, “research only” universities can only exist
2For Italy, we plot only the “incentive” allocation. At the moment, only a small proportion
of total funding is allocated in this way, the rest according to historic funding. The aim is
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Figure 2: Research intensity and number of students.
in a private system where the government oﬀers all institutions a lump sum
subsidy, unrelated to teaching or research performance, and are sub-optimal.
The paper is organised as follows. We present the model in Section 2:
the universities in Section 2.1, the students and the labour market in 2.2. In
Section 3 we study a private university system unencumbered by government
intervention, and in Section 4 derive the government optimal policy. Section 5
shows that the government policy can be implemented by oﬀering a lump-sum
grant which is higher the lower is the fee charged by universities to students. In
Section 6 these two systems are compared against the common benchmark of
the system a perfectly informed government would design. Finally, in Section
7 we argue that the analysis is robust to relaxation of some of the assumptions:
we indicate how distributional concerns can be taken into account in Section
7.1; we introduce some student mobility in Section 7.2, the dependence of their
willingness to pay on the research output of the university in Section 7.3, and
we suggest, in Section 7.4 how a university’s productivity could be determined
endogenously. Section 8 is a brief conclusion. The proofs of all mathematical
results are gathered in the Appendix.
2T h e m o d e l
2.1 Universities.
4We study an economy with a continuum of separated local education markets
and a single economy-wide “global” labour market. The local education markets
can be thought of as diﬀerent towns or counties. In the global labour market
there are two types of jobs, skilled and unskilled: skilled jobs require a university
education. This is obtained in the local education markets, in each of which
there is a single potential university, which has monopoly power:3 it is available
to all local residents, and only to them.4 Potential universities diﬀer in the value
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distribution of θ in the economy follows a diﬀerentiable function F (θ),w i t h
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1−F(θ) is the average type for types above θ.( 1 ) i m p o s e s a n
upperbound on the slope of the hazard rate, and replaces the usual monotonicity
constraint. It is satsﬁed, like the latter, for most commonly used distribution
functions. Note that the RHS of (1) can have either sign and so (1) can be




, is normalised without loss of generality to 1.
Universities can engage in research and teaching. To do so they must build
lecture theatres, laboratories, libraries and so on, and employ “professors”. The





3We do not consider competition among universities. This has also received limited at-
tention in the literature: among the few contributions, in Del Rey (2001), universities choose
the amount of research, and funding is positively related to the number of students. De Fraja
and Iossa (2002) show that, if students are suﬃciently mobile, competition among universities
causes the emergence of “elite” institutions, which carry out more research and teach the best
students. The link between competition and governance is analysed empirically in Aghion et
al (2008).
4This is a simple way of capturing the assumption that students are not inﬁnitely mobile:
if they were, given constant returns to scale in production, there would be only one university,
teaching all students, and carrying out all research. While this concentration may be optimal
for some training centres, such as sporting academies, it clearly is not for tertiary education.
Section 7.2 hints that allowing imperfect students mobility does not alter the qualitative
features of the analysis.
5The stylised model of Section 7.4 illustrates how a university’s value of θ can be determined
endogenously as an equilibrium variable.
5where n>0 is the number of professors employed, r > 0 the amount of re-
search carried out, and t > 0, the number of students taught. (2) implies that
research and teaching both require professors, and that θ is a positive measure
of productivity: a university with a higher θ needs fewer professors for a given
amount of research and teaching.6 The linear relationship with the number of
professors implies that there are no economies of scale or scope, and that teach-
ing and research are perfect substitutes as outputs.7 All non-staﬀ resources are
assumed to be proportional to staﬀ numbers, and therefore are fully captured
by the parameter θ.
Universities receive income from students, who pay a tuition fee of p ∈ R
each (negative if students are subsidised), and possibly from the government,
in the form of a grant g ∈ R (which again can be negative, and therefore a tax).
A university’s budget constraint8 is
pt + g − yn =0 ,( 3 )
where y is the salary paid to a professor, endogenously determined by a com-
petitive labour market for skilled workers (see below).
We posit that the objective function of each university is the maximisation
of the amount of research it does, interpreted here as “blue sky” research.9
Universities view teaching as a source of income, used to fund research, not
an activity that increases their utility directly. This tallies with the empirical
regularities that universities are by and large managed by academics whose
vocation is research, and that academics’ rewards and progress are more closely
linked to success in research than in teaching.10 This of course does not mean
6The normalisation of
1
θ as the number of staﬀ needed to produce one combined unit of
outputs will prove convenient when solving the government optimisation problem.
7Though there may be some complementarities, today’s highly specialised nature of scien-
tiﬁc research suggests that they are at best limited, and that resources, viz academic time,
devoted to teaching are in fact resources subtracted to research.
8Other components of a university’s budget constraint such as income from endowment,
alumni donations, or state subsidies to tuition fees are included implicitly in (3). For example,
p can be interpreted as including the net present values of future alumni donations. (3) cap-
tures the plain fact that if a university with a given endowment income and alumni donations
wishes to increase its research expenditure, it must do so by increasing tuition revenues. This
is an accepted explanation for the steep increase in tuition costs of the past decades in the
US university sector (Ehrenberg 2007).
9Externally funded research or consultancy fees, can be treated as separate activities and
we disregard them in what follows.
10Tuckman et al (1977) noted a long time ago that “outstanding teaching appears to yield
a low rate of return” (p 697) and that “teaching and public service yield low compensation;
6that universities do not care about teaching: a university may care passionately
about the quality of its teaching, and indeed most do, but this is exactly in the
same sense as a ﬁrm cares passionately about the quality of its products: both
are means of furthering the organisation’s objective, not ends in themselves.11
Note also that in our set-up the concept of research can be plausibly extended:
“research” can be deﬁned as any academic activity which bestows an externality
on society by beneﬁtting individuals or organisations who cannot be made to
pay for it.12
We also assume that there is an upper limit to the amount of research that
can be carried out in each university: let rmax be this bound. This constraint
is only necessary when the government has perfect information, and therefore
we think of it as very “high”, in a sense made precise in Assumption 1.
2.2 Students and the labour market.
Each local education market serves a population of potential students, with
measure normalised to 1. Every potential student can attend university, obtain
a degree, and subsequently work in the skilled labour market (which includes
working as a professor), receiving income:
y(R),( 4 )
publishing and administration carry much larger returns” (p 701); see also Hammond et al
(1969). More recently, self-selection and the endogeneity of teaching loads make it more
diﬃcult to ascertain an independent impact of teaching on rewards (Euwals and Ward 2005,
p 1663, and Golden et al 2009), and indeed, in his survey of the academic labour market,
Ehrenberg (2004) does not report studies of the relationship between teaching and research
and lifetime earnings.
11Similarly, it is commonly assumed that “non-proﬁt” hospitals do in fact strive to maximise
proﬁt, which they do not distribute to owners as dividends, but use instead to further their
aims, from excellence in research, to treating patients who are unable to pay (Danzon (1982)
and Dranove and White (1994)). The link is in fact arguably stronger in universities, as
typically good teaching attracts good students who both reduce the cost of teaching and may
attract good staﬀ improving research prowess (Rothschild and White (1995)).
12Thus for example universities may subsidise doctoral supervision, or oﬀer scholarship
and ﬁnancial aid to students from deprived backgrounds: these activities are undertaken by
universities because they increase their payoﬀ, even though — by deﬁn i t i o n—t h e yd on o t
generate enough revenue to cover their cost. They generate beneﬁts to (parts of) society,
for example by increasing future research activities or enhancing diversity and oﬀering role-
models to able individuals in deprived neighbourhoods, and so they ﬁtt h i se x t e n d e dd e ﬁnition
of “research”. Further outputs have been suggested, such as the transfer of knowledge (Johnes
et al 2005), or the production of human capital (Rothschild and White 1995). These simply
extend the concept of teaching.
7or obtain basic education only, which guarantees an unskilled job, with income
y(R) − ∆,( 5 )
where ∆ > 0 denotes therefore the salary premium earned by graduates. R > 0
measures the “state of technology in the society”, the value of all research
undertaken in the university sector. R is deﬁned as follows: if r(θ) is the




r(θ)f (θ)dθ.( 6 )
The positive externality of research implies that y0 (R) > 0:w o r k e r s — b o t h
skilled and unskilled — are more productive if more research is carried out in
society.14
(4) and (5) imply that the labour markets are “global”: the earnings asso-
ciated to a job depend only on the global variable R, not on where the workers
have obtained education15 or on the location of the job.
Students incur an eﬀort cost if they go to university. This is denoted16
by a ∈ [amin,a max), and its value is distributed among the potential students
in each local market according to a distribution function Φ(a) with density







While basic education is available in each local labour markets at no cost,
attending university requires that the potential university becomes active. If
the type θ university does so, it sets a tuition fee a tuition fee p(θ) which
students must pay to attend university. A potential student of type a takes
this tuition fee and the labour market rewards, y(R) and ∆,a sﬁxed. She
chooses to attend university and work in the skilled labour market if and only
13In the equilibrium we consider, all type θ universities make identical choices, and so r(θ)
and t(θ) are the amount of research and the number of students in each type θ university.
Moreover, both r(θ) and t(θ) turn out to be monotonic, and therefore (Riemann) integrable.
14Note that the number of graduates does not aﬀect earnings. This may be due to perfect
international labour mobility and is a simpliﬁcation relative to De Fraja and Valbonesi (2008),
where the labour market income functions (4) and (5) also include the total number of grad-
uates as argument. All the results regarding the structure of the university system obtained
in De Fraja and Valbonesi (2008) carry through to the simpliﬁed version of the model.
15See Section 7.3, for a suggestion of how to include the “quality” of education in the
workers’ utility.
16The restriction to linear cost is simply a normalisation of the measure of the cost relative
to the distribution function Φ(a). As shown in De Fraja and Valbonesi (2008) including a




c0(a) for every a ∈
(amin,a max). See also Section 7.3 below.
8if17 her earnings, net of tuition fees, and reduced by the cost of eﬀort while at
university, exceed the income obtained from the unskilled labour market:
y(R) − p(θ) − a > y(R) − ∆.
Therefore there is a threshold value of a,g i v e nb y∆ − p(θ), such that only
individuals with a equal or lower than ∆ − p(θ) attend university and work in
the skilled labour market.
To ensure that only some of the potential students attend university, we
posit ∆ ∈ (amin,a max): that is, with a zero tuition fee, some students would
like to go to university, others would not.
Note that, for simplicity, a denotes only the cost of attending university.
The observation that labour market rewards are higher for higher “ability”
individuals can be easily captured by positing a correlation between the eﬀort
cost of attending university and the eﬀort cost of working: low a individuals
receive the same salary but enjoy higher utility than high a individuals.18
Another simpliﬁcation is that the students’ utility, and hence their will-
ingness to pay for a university education, does not depend on the type of the
university attended. Section 7.3 suggests a stylised but plausible way of relax-
ing this restriction, which would also add realism to the tuition fee structure of
the university sector. We do not introduce this in the main part of the paper,
because doing so would complicate the algebra considerably.
We study the steady state of a dynamic model where new research carried
out in a period balances the reduction of research stock due to obsolescence, and
where students tuition is ﬁnanced either by parents or by loans secured on their
future income. In the absence of perfect capital markets, diﬀerential borrowing
cost among households can be included in the cost of attending university,
a, which would then measure a combination of the utility cost of eﬀort and
the interest payments on loans ﬁnancing university attendance. Interesting
on its own right, the steady-state analysis isalso a necessary ﬁrst step in the
study of a fuller dynamic model, where the accumulated stock of knowledge,
not just current research, aﬀects labour market earnings, and where there are
intergenerational transfers.
17We maintain throughout, for the sake of deﬁniteness, the assumption that indiﬀerent
students attend university: since they have measure 0 in [amin,a max], this entails no loss of
generality.
18Allowing earnings also to depend on a has no qualitative eﬀects on the analysis of the
potential students’ choices, as long as, naturally, the eﬀect is stronger in the skilled labour
market, but would unnecessarily complicate the analysis, because the university salary would
in this case not be straightforward to calculate.
93 Equilibrium with no government
In this section we study the benchmark where the university sector is private,
and government intervention is limited to at most a lump sum subsidy or tax,
independent of anything a university does. The number of students taught by
a university of type θ which becomes active and chooses tuition fee p(θ) is:
t(θ)=Φ(∆ − p(θ)).( 7 )
Universities charge the same price to all students, for example, because they
cannot observe their type, and have no instruments to provide incentives for
truth-telling. Universities do not “select” students: they never exclude students
who are willing to enrol at the current fee. Gary-Bobo and Trannoy (2008)
show that if students have imperfect information about their ability, research
maximising universities do select students.
Let us deﬁne the function zk :[ 0 ,1] −→ R,w i t hk ∈ [0,1], which plays a





zk can be called the adjusted marginal teaching cost. To interpret it, note
that if a university wants to add marginal students in measure dt to those al-
ready enrolled, it needs to enrol students whose cost of attendance is Φ−1 (t),
and so the fee must be adjusted to entice them. When k =1 , the second com-
ponent of the RHS of (8) is the lost fee income due to the fact that already
enrolled students also pay the lower tuition fee. The number of the infra-
marginal students who beneﬁt from the fee reduction, relative to the number of
newly enrolled type Φ−1 (t) students, is the hazard rate,
Φ(Φ−1(t))
φ(Φ−1(t)) , which equals
t
φ(Φ−1(t)). This component of the marginal cost is oﬀset when there is a social
beneﬁt to the fact that attendance to university becomes cheaper. We can take
k ∈ [0,1], as an inverse measure of the social beneﬁt of the fee reduction: when
k =0 , the lower revenues of the university are exactly compensated by the
lower fees paid by the students, and the marginal cost of an extra student is
unaﬀected by the fact that the university suﬀers a loss of revenue loss. In the
intermediate case, k ∈ (0,1), the university’s revenue loss is only partly com-
pensated by gains elsewhere; as we see in the next Section, this happens when
the decision maker strictly prefers the universities to be funded by students fees
than by general taxation, for example because of distributional, deadweight or
administrative costs of taxation.
10Lemma 1 (i) zk (t) is strictly increasing for every k ∈ (0,1]. (ii) For every
k ∈ [0,1], zk (0) = amin. (iii) Let k1 >k 0; then, for every t>0, we have
zk1 (t) >z k0 (t) and z0
k1 (t) >z 0
k0 (t).
The proof of all the results in the paper is in the Appendix. We can now
establish our ﬁrst result.




















students, provided the above is non-negative.
The number of students is set in (10) at a level such that the revenue
which can be extracted from an additional student — her additional income ∆
—, reduced by z1 (t(θ)) — the lost revenue due to the fee reduction necessary
to induce this additional student — equals the university’s cost of teaching this
student,
y(R)
θ . The university acts as a proﬁt maximising monopolist, and uses
the proﬁtt oﬁnance research.





dθ < 0, dr
dθ > 0,a n ddn
dθ > 0.
More productive universities do therefore teach more students, charge a
lower price to attract them, employ more academics and carry out more re-
search. These relationships between size output and eﬃciency are often ob-
served in empirical studies,19 and sometime attributed to complementarities
between teaching and research (Becker 1975 and 1979): teachers (respectively
researchers) are thought to be more productive if they also do some research
19Cohn et al (1989) study a sample of 1887 US colleges and universities in 1981-82, through
a multi-product cost approach: they ﬁnd economies of scale and scope. De Groot et al
(1991) Glass et al (1995) and Dundar and Lewis (1995) extended Cohn’s research focusing
respectively on the sensitivity of the cost functions estimates to diﬀerent output measures,
on ﬂexible cost function, and on the departmental production function. For stochastic and
non-stochastic frontier analyses, see for example Izadi et al (2002) and McMillan and Chan
(2006) and the references cited in these papers.
11(respectively teaching). The empirical evidence for these complementarities is
ﬂimsy (Hattie and Marsh 1996). Corollary 1 shows that they need not neces-
sarily imply that there are economies of scale and scope in the technology, but
they could be due instead to an underlying unobserved parameter: universities
w h i c he m p l o ym o r es t a ﬀ have lower measured unit costs, both in teaching and
in research, even though each university employs the same linear technology
with no economies of scale and scope.
The above analysis clearly holds if the university of type θ is able to operate.
We turn next to the question of which universities are in fact active. For
university of type θ to be active, it must be that, at its optimal number of





− t(θ) > 0.( 1 1 )
Note that, for an active university, the optimal number of students is indepen-
dent of the grant g. This has the following immediate consequence.





The interpretation of (12) is natural: the teaching cost of a student is
y(R)
θ .
For the university to want to teach a strictly positive measure of students, it
must be worth for at least the students with the lowest a to pay for this cost,
and the willingness to pay for tuition of this student is the increase in her labour
market earnings as a consequence of her having a degree, ∆, reduced by the
utility cost of attending university, amin.
Consider research now. Clearly, if g =0 , a university can do research if and
only if it can make positive revenues from its teaching. If g>0, universities with
type lower than the RHS in (12) can do some research by enrolling no students
and spending all their grant on research: they are research only institutions,
but they are the least productive among the active universities. Conversely,
if g<0, then some universities are prevented from becoming active which
would raise enough tuition fees to pay their teaching costs, and the smallest
universities teach a strictly positive number of students and do no research.
t(θ), p(θ) and r(θ) of course depend on R, which we need to derive to close





r(θ)f (θ)dθ,( 1 3 )
where r(θ) is given in (11) p(θ) and t(θ) in Proposition 1.
124 Government intervention.
We now assume that the government intervenes actively in the higher education
sector. We do not address the issue of actual ownership of universities. Anec-
dotal evidence suggests that there is little systematic diﬀerence in eﬃciency
or in objective function between private and public universities. We simply
assume that the government imposes constraints on the university sector, and
that these constraints are the same for public and for private universities.
The crucial assumption in the paper is that universities have both a trade-
oﬀ between teaching and research which leans more towards research than the
government’s, and an informational advantage over the government. This tallies
with our perception of universities, be they public or private. Formally, the
government maximises total utility in society, and universities know their own
θ and how much r they carry out, while the government cannot observe either.20
The government designs the university policy.21 I no u rm o d e l ,t h i si ss i m p l y
a pair of functions {p(t),g(t)},o ﬀered to all potential universities: the govern-
ment commits to linking the number of students enrolled, t, with the tuition fee
a university is allowed to charge, p(t), and with the lump sum grant awarded to
the university, g (t) (both p(t) and g (t) can be negative). Faced with this policy,
each university can choose freely the number of students it enrols, receiving the
corresponding government grant g (t), and charging the corresponding tuition
fee p(t). The government’s grant to universities is funded by general taxation;
to keep things simple, we model taxation as a lump sum tax h,t h es a m ef o ra l l
individuals. Naturally, this is constrained not to exceed the income from the
unskilled labour market: h 6 y(R) − ∆. In the rest of the paper we assume
that this constraint is in fact slack; that is we assume, plausibly, that the total
tax needed to ﬁnance the preferred level of tertiary education is not so high
as to require more than the aggregate income that would be obtained with no
university sector, when all workers are unskilled. Raising one unit of resources
in tax has an exogenously given cost (1 + λ) > 1. As Section 7.1 shows, in
addition to the standard administrative and distortionary costs of taxation, λ
also captures the government’s preference for redistribution.
20Some research is of course ex-ante observable and ex-post measurable. Our assumption
of asymmetric information requires only that at least some research is neither. This is highly
plausible, uncertainty being the essence of research activities, where a large (unobserved)
research eﬀort may well lead to no results, and conversely, serendipity and luck may produce
huge returns at little cost.
21Beath et al (2005) take the funding mechanism as given and concentrate on the eﬀects
on incentives for teaching and research quality of diﬀerent public funding schemes.
13To determine the government’s optimal policy, we take the standard reve-
lation approach. The government asks each university to report its own type,
and commits to imposing a vector of variables as functions of the reported type,
which the university must adhere to: by the revelation principle, the govern-
ment cannot improve on the payoﬀ it can obtain by restricting its choices to
the set of mechanisms such that no university has an incentive to mis-report
its type. With this perspective, a policy is a triple, {t(θ),p(θ),g(θ)}θ∈(0,¯ θ],
the number of students, the tuition fee and the government grant as a func-
tion of the reported type. The employment at university of type θ is given by
n(θ)=
p(θ)t(θ)+g(θ)
y(R) . We include both t and p as policy variables, thus allowing,
potentially, the number of students enrolled in a university to be diﬀerent from
the number of individuals who, given the tuition fee, would prefer to graduate.
Clearly, it cannot exceed it, and so we must impose the constraint




.( 1 4 )
(14) says that the type of the marginal student must be no greater than the
type of the student who is indiﬀerent between going and not going to university.
As we show below, (14) is in fact binding at the government’s optimal policy:
it cannot happen that the number of university places needs to be rationed by
non-price methods. Intuitively, this is so because the shadow cost of public
funds exceeds 1, and so it is always preferable for the government to raise funds
through tuition fees than through taxes.
To set up the government’s problem as an optimal control in a suitable way,
we introduce the auxiliary variable R, the total amount of research, subject to
deﬁnitional constraints (6). θ,t h ec u t - o ﬀ point type of university, such that
those above operate, those below do not, is also determined endogenously, as
the “initial time” (Leonard and van Long 1992, p 222 ﬀ). Finally, r(θ) too is
treated as a variable chosen by the government, subject, as explained above, to
the incentive compatibility constraint that all universities prefer to reveal their
type truthfully. We derive this constraint in Proposition 2. Note ﬁr s tt h a tt h e




− t(θ).( 1 5 )
Proposition 2 Let θ be the least productive active university. The incentive













˙ t(θ) > 0. (17)
We denote with a dot over a variable its derivative with respect to θ.Af u r -
ther constraint is that each university satisﬁes its budget constraint. Substitute
(2) into (3), to obtain:
y(R)
θ




.( 1 8 )
Further, the number of students in a local market must be non-negative




.( 1 9 )
t(θ) cannot exceed 1 either: since ∆ <a max, if the number of students from
a local education market were 1, then the total utility form individuals in that
market could be increased simply by stopping the students with the highest





were t(θ)=1cannot happen at the optimum, and the constraint
t(θ) 6 1 can be omitted.
In the jargon of optimal control analysis, the problem can be written as a
free initial time optimal control problem with R as a parameter; the integral
constraint (6) is re-written as a state constraint (Leonard and van Long, 1992,
p 190), with r0 (θ) as an auxiliary variable:
˙ r0 (θ)=r(θ)f (θ), r0 (θ)=0 , r0
¡¯ θ
¢
= R;( 2 0 )
The instruments described and the constraints derived, we can ﬁnally present
the government’s problem. This is the maximisation of a welfare function made
up of three components. First, the total after tax income of the population.
Second the disutility costs borne by those who attend university. And third,
the non-monetary value of research, which we measure by ωR,w i t hω > 0:22
ω is a parameter of the government payoﬀ function, and captures aspects such
as the national pride at the award of Nobel prizes, Fields Medals, and other
formal or informal recognition.
22Formally this is identical to including a proportion ω of the universities payoﬀ in the
computation of social welfare, just as a share of a regulated ﬁrm’s proﬁt is typically included.







(∆ − p(θ))t(θ) −
Z Φ−1(t(θ))
amin
aφ(a)da − (1 + λ)g(θ)
!
f (θ)dθ
+ y(R) − ∆F (θ)+ωR, (21)
s.t. (14), (16), (17), (18), (19) and (20)
To derive the payoﬀ function intuitively, note that the total utility of the
potential students in a type θ local education market is given by
(y(R) − ∆ − h)+( ∆ − p(θ))t(θ) −
Z Φ−1(t(θ))
amin
aφ(a)da.( 2 2 )
This has a natural interpretation: all potential students receive after tax income
y(R) − ∆ − h at least; of the potential students, t(θ) do go to university, and
receive an additional income, net of tuition fee, equal to ∆ − p(θ): this is the
second term in (22). The aggregate disutility cost of attending university is
given by the last term in (22). Integrate over θ and add ωR, the direct beneﬁt
of research, to obtain (21).
Proposition 4 describes the government’s optimal policy. For given R and




+ ζ (R,N;θ),( 2 3 )
where,
ζ (R,N;θ)=

















and let the vector (R,θ,N) solve the following system of three equations in
three unknowns:






































˜ θ2 d˜ θ
⎞
⎟
⎠f (θ)dθ.( 2 6 )
We said before that we require rmax to be “high”. Formally we now posit:













This implies that at the solution, no university is constrained by the re-
quirement r(θ) 6 rmax, and this constraint can be omitted from Problem (21).




























˜ θ2 d˜ θ. (29)























then (24)-(29) solve Problem (21).
To interpret Proposition 4, note ﬁrst of all that the optimal values of R,
the total amount of research in society, and θ the least productive university
are given by (24)-(26). As shown in the Appendix, N is the total employment
in academia. Given these “global” variables, (27) gives the number of students
in university θ. This, as shown in the Appendix, is increasing, which says that
more productive universities have more students. (29) shows that they also do
more research. As we saw in Section 3, this was also the case with unfettered
private provision. The explanation, however, is diﬀerent in this case: with
unfettered private provision, a more productive university needs to teach more
students to be able to carry out more research. On the other hand, when the
government controls the sector, it asks more productive universities to teach
more students because they are more productive: precisely for the same reason
it also asks them to carry out more research. This diﬀerent angle is brought
in starker relief in Section 6, which presents the case in which the government
is not constrained by its information disadvantage, and is therefore able to
separate the allocation of teaching and research.
5 Implementation: The design of the funding scheme.
In this Section we show how the above mechanism can be implemented in




















Denote by TF (θ) the total funding available to a type θuniversity. Substitute
(16) and (18) into the above, to obtain:






˙ t(θ) > 0.( 3 1 )
From (31) we can draw the relationship between t and TF, which we depict in
the north-east quadrant of Figure 3. This is derived in the following way: the
south-west quadrant illustrates the relationships between θ and the number of
students t(θ), taught by a type θ university, given in (27). This is increasing.
Also increasing, by (31), is the relationship between θ and the total funding
a v a i l a b l et oat y p eθ university, TF (θ), in the north-west quadrant. Joining
the two via the 45 degree line in the south-east quadrant, we obtain, in the
north-east quadrant, the relationship between the number of students and the
total funding available to a university. If the government oﬀers this relationship
to all universities, allowing each to choose any point on the curve, then each
university will select the combination of students given by (27) and total funding
which will allow it carry out the amount of research given by (29). Note that
t(θ) is increasing, and since the total funding also is (from (31)), then so is the
relationship between number of students and total funding, as depicted.
18The following Corollary illustrates that the relationship is concave, and
therefore, as in Laﬀont and Tirole’s (1993 pp 69-73) analysis of procurement
contracts, the policy can be implemented by oﬀering universities a menu of
“subsidy per student”-“lump-sum grant” combination.
Corollary 3 The relationship between TF and t is concave.
Therefore the government can simply oﬀer all universities a menu of linear
contracts, gT (p),w h e r ep, the tuition fee per student, is given by the slope
of the tangent of the curve in the north-east quadrant, and gT,t h el u m ps u m
grant, is the ordinate of this tangent. Faced with this menu, each university will
simply select the combination of funding and fee per student that corresponds
to its own type. Concavity of the curve implies that universities which charge
students less are “rewarded” with a larger lump-sum grant.
6 The systems compared.
To interpret the solution obtained in Proposition 4, it is helpful to compare it
with the policy the government would choose if, ex-ante,i tk n e wp e r f e c t l yt h e
type of each university, or, equivalently, if it could ex-post measure precisely
each university’s research eﬀort. This is referred to as the ﬁr s tb e s ta n di s































rmax.( 3 3 )



























The number of students, given in (34), has a similar expression as for the
unfettered market case, (10), and for the case of asymmetric information (27).
From the former it diﬀers as z λ
1+λ




does not include the information distortion terms. The two
19expressions are identical when θ = ¯ θ (eﬃciency at the top).The expression for
university’s amount of research, (36), on the other hand, is radically diﬀerent
from the corresponding expression for the case of asymmetric information, (29).
While Assumption 1 ensures that the upper boundary on research is not binding
in the asymmetric information case, this is not possible in this case, since the
government does not need to provide incentives for research, but can simply
command and control the activities of each university. It therefore allocates
research to the most productive universities, its only constraint the technolog-
ical upper bound.23 Unlike the private market case and the case of imperfect
information, with perfect information there are “teaching only” universities.








enrol students but carry out no






















The subsidy is negative for the “teaching only” universities: they receive more
in fees that they pay out in salaries, and their surplus is transferred to the high
θ universities which do research. Students attending these universities pay for
research carried out elsewhere. This does not happen in the unfettered private
market, or with asymmetric information. In the latter case, if a university
spends more than its revenues, the shortfall is funded only by the taxpayer.
Notice that in our model there is no natural welfare ranking of the total
amount of research in the three regimes. This is because even though research
does bestow an externality, it is not necessarily underprovided by an unfettered
private university sector: whether or not it is depends in general on the balance
between technology — how much the nation’s scientiﬁc and cultural state aﬀects
the production of goods and services —, the direction research takes — how much
of what researchers do spills over to the rest of society —, and on the subjective
preferences of the government.24 In other words, the ﬁr s tb e s tv a l u eo fR (the
preferred amount of research when the government has perfect information)
23In Proposition 5, research can take two values only, rmax or 0. This follows from the
hypothesis that marginal cost is 0 up to the exogenously given upper bound, and is +∞
beyond it. With less extreme forms of decreasing returns to research expenditure, the “bang-
bang” nature of the research policy would be tempered: the concentration of research in the
most productive universities would remain, but diﬀerent high productivity universities would
do diﬀerent amount of research.
24While a mathematical theorem may eventually help improve computer software used in
designing robots, a chemical discovery may allow the development of more eﬀective drugs,
reducing the number of days lost due to illness, and advances in game theory may lead
20may well be lower than the amount of research carried out in an unfettered
private market. To see this, think of a situation where research has little social
beneﬁt: y0 (R),t h ee ﬀect on aggregate income, and ω, the non-monetary beneﬁt
of research, are both small. If ∆ is suﬃciently large, then students are willing
to pay for university tuition, so universities can use the income raised to pay for
their research and the total amount may exceed that which a welfare maximising
government would want to choose.25
The following assumption allows us to abstract from the equity and eﬃ-
ciency eﬀect of the aggregate amount of research and to concentrate on the
more microeconomic aspect of the distribution of teaching and research across
institutions.
Assumption 2 rmax and ω are such that the equilibrium total amount of re-
search, R, is the same in the three regimes considered.
It is in general possible for the parameters rmax and ω to satisfy Assumption
2. To see this, let ˆ R be the amount of research in the unfettered private market.
ˆ R is independent of both rmax and ω, as (13) shows. Therefore there exists a
value of ω such that the aggregate amount of research chosen by the government
under asymmetric information equals ˆ R ( t h i si st h ev a l u eo fω such that the
R H Si n( 2 5 )e q u a l s ˆ R). Finally, note that rmax appears only in the solution
for the ﬁrst best case, and, when it is such that the RHS in (33) is ˆ R,t h e n
Assumption 2 holds.
Figure 4 illustrates the distribution of the total amount of research across
universities in the three regimes, under Assumption 2, so that the total research
is the same in all three. The three curves depict the amount of research as a
function of the productivity of the university, θ. The solid one with private
provision, the dashed curve in the case of government intervention with imper-
fect information, the dotted curve when the government can perfectly observe
each university’s productivity. The integral (with measure f (θ))o ft h et h r e e
curves is the same, and so the dashed line is above the solid one for high θ
and vice versa, as drawn. The dotted line is 0 below the threshold value of θ
given in (36) (the “teaching only” institutions), and at its maximum above this
threshold. The intuition is that, with perfect information, the government can
to improved incentive mechanisms used by organizations to select and motivate staﬀ,o t h e r
research activities could instead be viewed as an end in itself, academics indulging in their
hobbies, with no expected current or long term beneﬁtt os o c i e t y .
25Formally, given the assumption that w
00 (R) < 0,
y(R)
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Figure 4: The amount of research with private and government provision.
separate teaching and research: the former is chosen on the basis of eﬃciency
and equity considerations in teaching only, in each local market to the point
where marginal beneﬁts equal marginal costs. The total amount of research,
R, is chosen at the optimally global level (see (33)), given by the condition
that global marginal beneﬁts equal global marginal costs. This total amount of
research is allocated to the university sector in the most cost eﬀective way, by
asking the most productive universities to do as much research as they can.
Consider next the distribution and the number of students in the three
regimes. The following summarises the comparison.
Corollary 4 Let Assumptions 1 and 2 hold. Then the following hold:
1. The universities active with unfettered private provision are the same a
perfectly informed government would allow to operate; fewer universities
a r ea c t i v ew i t ha s y m m e t r i ci n f o r m a t i o n .
2. With unfettered private provision, each active university has fewer stu-
dents than it would have with a perfectly informed government.
3. Relative to perfect information, the government information disadvantage
reduces the number of students at each university except the most produc-
tive.
The diagram of Figure 5 illustrates. The Corollary implies that, compared
with private provision, government intervention concentrates students in the
most productive institutions: the higher (lower) productivity institutions have
220 t































θ = θ θ < θ
min a
Figure 5: The Determination of the number of students.
more (fewer) students than they would in a private system. The horizontal
axis measures the number of students. This, for university θ,i sg i v e nb yt h e
intersection of the increasing line z λ
1+λ
(t), under government provision, and








+ ζ (R,N;θ) with imperfect government information,
The LHS of Figure 5 shows the determination of the number of students
at the highest possible value of θ. Assumption 2 holds, and so the horizontal
line ∆−
y(R)
θ is the same in all three regimes. The number of students is lower
with private provision than with government intervention. This is so because, as
Lemma 1 implies, when k increases from 0 to 1,t h ec u r v ez swings anticlockwise
around the point (0,a min), and since 1=l i m λ→+∞
λ
1+λ,t h ec u r v ez is lower
under government provision for every ﬁnite value of λ.I n t h i s c a s e w e h a v e
tpr <t AI = tPI. This has a natural explanation: unlike private universities,
the government receives some beneﬁt from the fact that students pay lower
fees. It therefore will want to push the number of students recruited beyond
what a private university sector would do. How strong this eﬀect is depends
on the social cost of raising taxes to pay for students’ tuition: if this is very
high, then the overall government cost of enticing students to attend university
becomes similar to the private universities’ and the curve z λ
1+λ
(t) draws closer
to z1 (t).W h e n θ = ¯ θ,w eh a v etAI = tPI: this is the standard “eﬃciency at
the top” result. The RHS of Figure 5 considers a value of θ lower than ¯ θ.F o r
such θ, the horizontal curve is lower, for all three regimes, than with θ = ¯ θ, but
23is “more lower” when the government has imperfect information, as depicted
by the dotted horizontal line, because ζ (R,N;θ) is 0 and increasing at θ = ¯ θ.
As the RHS diagram shows, for suﬃciently low θ,w eh a v et h a ttAI <t pr and
both of them are smaller than tPI: productive universities do more research
than less productive ones both in an unfettered market and with the optimal
government policy, but they recruit more students in the latter regime, as is
roughly suggested by the data presented in Figure 2 in the introduction.
The intuition is the following. Research is cheaper in more productive uni-
versities, and so the government wants them to carry out more research. To give
them the incentive to do so, it rewards them with a combination of a larger total
income and a bigger number of students. A less productive university, which
would like to receive the higher total income promised to a productive one, is
thus deterred from claiming to have high productivity: if it did so, to receive
a bigger grant, it would also have to recruit an increased number of students.
This is costly, as they can only be recruited by charging them a lower fee. Since
it is less productive, extra students are more expensive than they would be for
ah i g h e rθ university, and the extra total income received for teaching more
s t u d e n t si sn o ts u ﬃcient to cover the cost of teaching them. The term ζ (θ) can
be interpreted as the information cost incurred by the government: except for
the most productive university, the balance between student fees and lump-sum
grant is ineﬃciently skewed towards student fees, so as to make less productive
universities less willing to expand their student intake.
As θ decreases further, the intersection of the horizontal lines with the curves
z1 (t) and z λ
1+λ
(t) move towards the vertical axis. The value of θ for which this
intersection reaches the axis is the type of the least productive university that
teaches any students: clearly this happens for the same value when provision is
via an unfettered private market and in the ﬁrst best, and for a lower value of
θ when the government has imperfect information: fewer universities are active
in this case.
Figure 6 sketches the relationship between θ and the number of students, in
the three regimes, analogously to Figure 4 for research. The dotted line, depict-
ing the perfect information case, coincides with the dashed one, the asymmetric
information case, at θ = ¯ θ (eﬃciency at the top), and with the solid one, the
private market case, at θ =
y(R)
∆−amin,b e c a u s ez1 (0) = z λ
1+λ
(0).
Notice the information externality among universities in diﬀerent local ed-
ucation markets: whether some students attend university or not depends on
the cost conditions in the rest of the university sector, even though the cost of









Figure 6: The number of students with private and government provision.
Recall that Figure 6 is drawn for the special case when Assumption 2 holds
and the total amount of research R i st h es a m ei nt h et h r e er e g i m e s .I ft h i si sn o t
the case, the horizontal curve in Figure 5 would have a diﬀerent position in each
regime, and the comparison would have to be made taking into account of the
diﬀerent position of this curve. In general, however, note that this horizontal
curve shifts down when R is higher: this naturally reﬂects the trade-oﬀ between
teaching and research.
7 Extensions.
We have studied a taxation and higher education general equilibrium model,
with a continuum of diﬀerent local markets, a continuum of diﬀerent students
in each market, and information, teaching and research interactions among all
the local markets mediated by a global labour market. This is a rich set-up,
and to keep the complexity at a manageable level, we have introduced a number
of simplifying assumptions. In this section, we illustrate that our results are
likely to survive unscathed in a richer set-up where some of the assumptions
are relaxed.
7.1 Concave utility function.
In normative analysis, it is customary to assume concavity of the utility func-
tion, to reﬂect the government’s preference for redistribution. In the paper,
25consumers’ utility function is instead assumed linear in income.26 Conversely,
we have also assumed that the shadow cost of public funds is strictly positive
and exogenously given. We show in this Section that relaxing both assumptions
together would generate a richer, but possibly intractable, general equilibrium
model, where the shadow cost of public funds is determined endogenously and
is higher when the utility function is “more concave”. This justiﬁes our as-
sumption of a linear utility function with exogenously given λ, which is thus
shown to be a good proxy for the government preference for redistribution.
Let the utility function of a type a consumer be given by U (y − a),w i t h
U0 (·) > 0, U00 (·) < 0. To maintain tractability, let there be a single value of
θ (that is, the support of f is degenerate): in this case, clearly, R = r,a n d






U (y(r) − p − a − g)φ(a)da +( 1− t)U (y(r) − g),( 3 7 )
s.t.: g + pt −
y(r)
θ
(r + t)=0 ,( 3 8 )
∆ − p − Φ−1 (t)=0 .( 3 9 )
We have dropped the argument (θ) of the functions p, t, g,a n dr chosen by
the government, omitted the constraint t > 0, and used the government budget
constraint g = h.
Proposition 6 If U00 (·) < 0, at the solution of problem (37)-(39), the Lagrange
multiplier of constraint (38) is given by
U0 ¡







where p, t, g,a n dr are the optimal tuition fee, number of students, lump-sum
grant and research eﬀort.
The denominator of the ﬁrst term is the average marginal utility of con-
sumption for all the individuals who become students, and the numerator is
the marginal utility of consumption of the marginal student. Since the average
student’s income, net of utility eﬀort cost, is higher for the average than for
the marginal student, if U00 (·) < 0 for at least some of the students, then the
26This is not restrictive for the positive analysis of Section 3, since with a single good, any
strictly increasing utility function can be monotonically transformed into a linear one.
26term is greater than 1, implying a strictly positive lagrange multiplier for the
government budget constraint, that is a strictly positive shadow cost of public
funds, even in the absence of distortionary and administrative costs of taxa-
tion. Moreover, the greater the diﬀerence between the denominator and the
numerator in (40) the greater the shadow cost of public funds.
7.2 Students mobility
We have so far assumed that students can only study at their local institution.
Therefore a university’s potential demand is given by all university age individ-
uals at the university location. In reality, students are not perfectly immobile.
While students’ mobility is not the focuso ft h i sp a p e r ,i ti sw o r t hh i n t i n ga t
how it can be introduced in a natural way.
Suppose that some students are prepared to leave their preferred27 local
education market to attend a university in diﬀerent one. A reduced form,
compact, manner of accounting for this is to let the distribution of potential
students of a university depend on the tuition fee it charges, p,a n do nt h e
average tuition fee in the sector, say ¯ p. Let therefore
Φc (a;p, ¯ p),
with density φc (a;p, ¯ p)=Φ0







0, be the distribution of potential students of a type θ university, charging fee
p, when the sector average tuition fee is ¯ p. Students preference for lower fees
is captured by the assumption that if p1 >p 0,t h e nΦc (a;p1, ¯ p) ﬁrst order sto-
chastically dominates Φc (a;p0, ¯ p). Repeating for the present case the analysis
carried out in Section 3, a university of type θ charging tuition fee p(θ) enrols
a number of student t(θ) satisfying:
t(θ)=Φc (∆ − p(θ),p(θ), ¯ p).
The relationship between t and p is now given by (denote, with slight abuse of
notation, by Φ−1
















∂p < 0. The analytical tractability of being able to deﬁne the
function zk independently of p is now lost, as the ﬁrst order condition for the
27Their preferred location may be their parents’ place of residence, or perhaps a distant
one, if they prefer t ol e a v eh o m et og ot ou n i v e r s i t y .












+ ∆ − Φ−1





Since the qualitative features of the function zk are unchanged in this more
general set-up, we would expect to obtain similar results as before. An inter-
esting by-product of this extension is likely to be the result that universities
that have more students also have abler students: students’ mobility breaks the
rigid link between the number of students and the ability level of the lowest
ability student in a given university.
7.3 Quality dependent willingness to pay.
In Section 7.2 students move to a diﬀerent location in response to price diﬀer-
ences. In practice, of course, students choose a given university on the basis
of other factors, principally quality. In the model developed so far, there is no
scope for this, as the type of the university attended by a student does not aﬀect
directly her utility. This is unrealistic, and has the unrealistic implication that
more productive universities charge lower tuition fees.
A simple way to make the university type directly aﬀect a student’s utility
is to deﬁne the cost of attending university as c(a,θ), a function of both the
student’s type, with ca (a,θ) > 0, and the university’s type, with cθ (a,θ) < 0:
studying at a better university is easier, and so has a lower eﬀort cost, or there
is more personal satisfaction and pride, which increase utility. The function












L e m m a1c o n t i n u e st oh o l d ,mutatis mutandis for the new notation. The uni-
versity’s ﬁrst order condition for the choice of r, (A2) in the Appendix, is not
changed conceptually, and so the relation between t and θ remains positive:
more productive universities enrol more students. On the other hand, the rela-
tionship between productivity and prices is given by the sign of
dp
dθ.T oc a l c u l a t e




















The ﬁrst term is negative, which gives Corollary 1 when c(a,θ)=a as in the rest
of the paper. In the case considered here, cθ (a,θ) < 0, and, if it is suﬃciently
28large in absolute value,
dp
dθ can become positive in a range of values of θ, yielding
the realistic conclusion that universities with higher productivity not only carry
out more research and teach more students, but also charge higher fees.
7.4 Endogenous determination of θ.
The methodology of our paper is inspired by the regulation and procurement
literature (Baron and Myerson 1982, Laﬀont and Tirole 1993), where the para-
meter distinguishing suppliers is, like here, their exogenously given productivity
parameter. It may be argued that in the case of universities productivity de-
pends in large measure on human capital, and so the assumption that θ is
exogenously ﬁxed is less justiﬁable than for the ﬁrms studied in the regulation
and procurement literature, where it is instead largely determined by the exist-
ing technology and the environmental conditions. It is therefore worth hinting
at how the model could be enriched by determining the productivity parameter
as part of the equilibrium rather than exogenously imposing it from outside.
A good starting point to model formally the relationship between θ and a
university’s human capital is the observation that the parameter characterising
a worker is in practice highly correlated with success in carrying out research:
those for whom studying at university is relatively less costly are also likely
to have a more productive academic career, and universities that appoint staﬀ
with lower a will, ceteris paribus, be more productive. In this subsection we
capture in a highly stylised way the idea that diﬀerences in the productivity of
universities are linked to diﬀerences in the distribution of a of their staﬀ.
Time is divided in periods. Universities are long lived. Workers live two
periods: they receive education during their ﬁrst period of life, are hired by
employers after completing education at the beginning of their second period of
life, and cannot change job until they retire. In each period a university trains
workers in their ﬁrst period of life, and employs skilled workers in their second
period of life. Within each period, the production and education processes take
place after the labour markets have cleared.
The markets for skilled labour open at the beginning of each period, and
close before research and teaching begin. Whilst the labour market is open,
each university receives a stream of job applicants who are randomly drawn
from [amin,a max] according to the distribution of skilled workers determined by
the education process of the previous period. Assume that a university cannot
turn away individual workers, but must hire all those who come along, until
it decides to stop hiring altogether. Assume also, somewhat artiﬁcially, that
29before commencing to teach and carry out research, a university can dismiss
the last hired of its workers. Some of these hypotheses are clearly ad hoc,a n d
we stress that the aim of this subsection is only to hint at what the building
blocks of a model of endogenous determination of θ could be.
Skilled workers have a reservation wage, y(R). Workers, universities and
employers are all assumed to predict correctly the value that R will take at the
end of the process. In equilibrium, a university’s salary oﬀer will therefore be
exactly y(R). The set of workers hired at any moment of the hiring process obey
a distribution FA, which is a monotonically increasing diﬀerentiable function
from [amin,a max] into R+, such that FA (amin)=0 .L e tA be the space of all
such functions, and let Θ be a function:




, Θ : FA 7−→ θ.( 4 1 )
In words, if a university’s distribution of staﬀ abilities in period t is FA (a),
then its productivity parameter in that period is Θ
¡
FA¢
.T oﬁxi d e a s ,Θ may
be thought of as mapping a distribution into its mean, but one can easily think
of reasons why size, variance, skewness, minimum and maximum, and so on
all matter, and so a generic functional form gives more ﬂexibility at no cost.
A natural, though not strictly necessary, requirement is that if FA1 (amax)=








Each university knows the slope of the relationship between n,t h en u m b e ro f
staﬀ hired, and the productivity parameter θ which will prevail in equilibrium,
n(θ): given the large number of universities, this relationship is deterministic,
both in a private market and with government intervention. At each moment
during the hiring process, the pair (θ,n) describing the number of staﬀ hired, n,
and the value of θ of the university given the distribution of its staﬀ,h a sf o l l o w e d




×R+ space. This path associates the size of the university,
n, to the value of the productivity the university had when the distribution of
its academics was given by FA,w i t hFA (amax)=n and Θ
¡
FA¢
= θ.T h e
current (n,θ) pair also determines t h ep o s s i b l ep a i r s(n,θ) which, with positive
probability, may characterise the university in the future. Let P (n,θ) denote
the set of all such pairs.
A utility maximising university stops hiring when the intersection between
n(θ) and the interior of the set P (n,θ) is empty, and subsequently reduce its
workforce to its preferred point on the intersection set of its past path and
n(θ). Figure 7.4 illustrates the idea. It depicts the (θ,n) Cartesian plane. A
university’s ﬁrst employee determines its initial quality, the point where the
30θ




Figure 7: The endogenous determination of θ.
squiggly line meets the horizontal axis. Subsequent hires determine diﬀerent
values of θ, depicted by the path. A university that has reached a point like A
will rationally continue to hire staﬀ, because the (θ,n) combination represented
by point A will not be “allowed” by the government or the private market.




This combination will be possible (in the speciﬁc sense that universities of type




However, a university that has reached point B will not stop hiring. The reason
is that it would be possible, if the university had a streak of high quality hires,
to reach a better point, which will again be feasible, such as point C, along the
solid path: the set P (n,θ) (represented by the “cone” centred in B of the points
which could theoretically be reached) does contain preferred point on the n(θ)
curve. At point C, on the other hand, this is not the case, and a university
that has reached point C will stop hiring. Finally, if the stream of recruits from
point B had generated the dotted path, then at a D, then the university would
need to stop hiring and to dismiss the most recent hires, to return to point B,
the best among the feasible points reached during the hiring process.
This model could be further enriched to include, plausibly, some history
dependence. A fully dynamic model may link the value of θ in one period to
its past values, even though in each period hires are random. This could be
due to better laboratories or structures inherited from the past. A shortcut to













In addition, skilled workers with a high a may prefer to work at a university
which had a high θ in the previous period. In this case, the distribution of
graduates seeking employment at a university could itself be aﬀected by θ,a n d




× [amin,a max] into R+ such that




and monotonically increasing in the second
argument..
T h ea s s u m p t i o nw h i c hm u s tb em a i n t a i n e dt or e t a i nt h eq u a l i t a t i v es t r u c -
ture of the model studied in Sections 2-6 is that a university cannot aﬀect the
quality of its staﬀ by altering the salary it oﬀers, or by selectively rejecting
applicants with low a.28
8 Concluding remarks
This paper studies how a utilitarian government should intervene in the uni-
versity sector. Intervention is beneﬁcial because of an externality in research,
which implies that, even though the total amount of research which is car-
ried out in an unfettered private might be the optimal level, its distribution
across universities is not. Speciﬁcally, we show that the private market spreads
research too thinly: if the government could freely determine who does how
much research, it would concentrate it in the most productive universities, and
allow less productive universities as “teaching only” institutions, whose stu-
dents subsidise research carried out elsewhere. The information disadvantage
of the government vis-à-vis the universities implies that this is not possible, and
the government must allow all teaching universities to do at least some research.
This is ineﬃcient, and it increases the overall cost of university provision. In
response to this increase, the government reduces the number of universities
relative to private provision. The overall eﬀect on the number of students is
ambiguous, because while there are fewer universities, the more productive ones
are given stronger incentives to admit more students.
28Work is in progress (Carrillo-Tudela and De Fraja 2008) to incorporate the ideas sketched
above into a rigorous search model, where graduates have preferences over the quality of the
institution they join, and the latter is determined by the employees’ ability.
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and (i) is established. (ii) follows immediately from (8). Consider (iii) next.
zk1 (t) − zk0 (t)=
(k1−k0)t














This end the proof of the Lemma.
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n1 .Substituting (2) into (3), we can write:
y(R)
θ













A university of type θ chooses p to maximise the RHS of the above. If an
internal solution exists, it satisﬁes the ﬁrst order condition















since t = Φ(∆ − p), (10) follows and (9) from it. The derivative of the LHS of
(A2) with respect to p is negative, implying that the second order condition is
satisﬁed at the optimum, and the proof of the Proposition is complete.
A1P r o o fo fC o r o l l a r y1 .The ﬁrst assertion follows from (10), noting that z−1
k
is increasing. The second from the ﬁrst and
dp
dt = − 1






























using (A3) and t(θ)+r(θ)=
p(t(θ))t(θ)+g




P r o o fo fC o r o l l a r y2 .The preferred value of t i sg i v e nb yt h ei n t e r s e c t i o no f
the increasing function z1 (t) with the horizontal line ∆−
y(R)
θ (see (10)). This
intersection occurs for a positive value of t if z1 (0) = Φ−1 (0) = amin < ∆−
y(R)
θ .
This establishes the Corollary.
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n2 .Let the government policy be {t(θ),p(θ),g(θ)}.




,u n i v e r s i t yo ft y p eθ is allowed to set a








































































The revelation principle requires that the above is maximised at ˆ θ = θ.T h e











p(ˆ θ)t(ˆ θ)+g(ˆ θ)






¯ ¯ ¯ ¯ ¯ ¯ ¯
ˆ θ=θ
=0,( A 5 )
A2which gives:
¡
p(θ) ˙ t(θ)+˙ p(θ)t(θ)+˙ g (θ)
¢ θ
y(R)
− ˙ t(θ)=0.( A 6 )
Next diﬀerentiate r(θ) g i v e ni n( 1 5 ) ,
˙ r(θ)=
£






− ˙ t(θ) ,
and substitute (A6) into it to obtain (16). Now (17): following Laﬀont and























































p(ˆ θ)t(ˆ θ)+g(ˆ θ)




from (16), to obtain (17).
Proof of Proposition 3. Consider local labour market θ.T h et o t a lp r e - t a x
utility of the potential students is:
Z Φ−1(t(θ))
amin
(y(R) − p(θ) − a − h)φ(a)da +( 1− t(θ))(y(R) − ∆ − h) ,
where the ﬁrst term is the total utility of the individuals who go to university,
and the second the total utility of those who work in the unskilled labour
market. Rearrange to obtain (22). Integrating for θ > θ,u s i n gt h ef a c tt h a t
(1 + λ)
R ¯ θ
θ g (θ)f (θ)dθ = h (the total tax paid equals the total value of the
subsidies given by the government to the university sector increased by the
deadweight loss costs of taxation per unit of tax raised), adding the direct
beneﬁt of research, ωR, and rearranging gives (21).
A3P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n4 .Begin by constructing the Lagrangean for (21):
L =
Ã
(∆ − p(θ))t(θ) −
Z Φ−1(t(θ))
amin














∆ − Φ−1 (t(θ)) − p(θ)
¤
+ η(θ)t(θ)+ρr(θ)f (θ) ,( A 7 )
where β (θ), τ (θ), η(θ), are the Lagrange multipliers for constraints (18), (14),
(19), respectively and µ(θ) and ρ are the Pontagryin multipliers for the state
variables in constraints (16) and (20), respectively. To simplify the analysis
of the perfect information case, we have multiplied the incentive compatibility
constraint (16) by an indicator δ ∈ {0,1},w i t hδ =1for the imperfect informa-
tion case, and δ =0for the case in which the government can costlessly observe
the type of the university and therefore is not subject to (16) and (17). The




= δ ˙ µ(θ)=−β (θ)
y(R)
θ
− ρf (θ) ;( A 8 )
∂L
∂g(θ)
= −(1 + λ)f (θ)+
δµ(θ)
y(R)



























and, for R and θ (Leonard and van Long, 1992, Theorem 7.11.1, p 255):





dθ ,( A 1 2 )
L(θ)=0.( A 1 3 )




− (1 + λ)f (θ) ,( A 1 4 )







− ρf (θ) .



























d˜ θ − (1 − F (θ))(1 + λ)y(R)
θ
.( A 1 5 )
Next substitute (A14) into (A10), to obtain:
τ (θ)=λt(θ)f (θ) .( A 1 6 )
(A16) implies that τ (θ) > 0 if λ > 0 and t(θ) > 0, and so (14) holds as an
equality: p(θ)=∆ − Φ−1 (t(θ)). Substitute this, β (θ) from (A14), τ (θ) from



































.( A 1 7 )
Substitute µ(θ) from (A15) to obtain:
z λ
1+λ







˜ θf(˜ θ)d˜ θ−(1−F(θ))(1+λ)y(R)
θ
(1 + λ)f (θ)θ
.( A 1 8 )
To continue with the proof, we need to derive the value of the multiplier ρ.
Expanding (A12) we have
ρ = y0 (R)
Ã












θ f (θ)dθ,—t h a ti sN is the total employment in universities












.( A 1 9 )
Now substitute (A19) into (A18) and use (23) to obtain (27).
A5Lemma A1 Let (30) hold, then −
y(R)
θ + ζ (θ) is increasing in θ.
Proof. Diﬀerentiate −
y(R)


























f0 (θ)θ +2 f (θ)
f (θ)
2 θ2 (1 − F (θ))
)
.( A 2 0 )
We want to divide the above by the term
Ã
1+











y(R) .( A 2 1 )
(A21) is clearly positive if f0 (θ)θ +2 f (θ) > 0. Consider therefore the case








1 − F (θ)
f (θ)
2 f0 (θ).( A 2 2 )
Derive f0 (θ) from (A22), and substitute it into (A21), to see that, if (1) holds,
then (A21) is positive. Next divide (A22) by (A21) and re-arrange to obtain
(A20) and establish the Lemma.
Since zk (t) is increasing, Lemma A1 and (27) imply that t(θ) also is and so









there is a threshold value of θ,c a l li tθ,s u c ht h a tt(θ) > 0 i fa n do n l yi fθ > θ.
Now we want to establish that the lowest θ determined in (24)-(26), θ,i s
also the value of θ such that t(θ)=0and t(θ) > 0 in a right neighbourhood.
Expand (A13). At θ, the terms in the square brackets in (A7) and the term
η(θ)t(θ) are all 0 because of the slackness complementarity constraints. Also
0 is the term ρr(θ)f (θ), because r(θ)=0 ,a n ds o :
L(θ)=
Ã
(∆ − p(θ))t(θ) −
Z Φ−1(t(θ))
amin
































f (θ)=0.( A 2 3 )












(1 + λ) ,
and so (A23) becomes:
L(θ)=
(h






























This is strictly positive for t(θ) > 0. Therefore L(θ)=0is increasing at
t(θ)=0 ,m a k i n g0 the only value of t where L(θ)=0 ,a n ds ot(θ)=0 .W h a t
remains to be established are (28) and (29). The ﬁrst follows from (14). To








































d˜ θ + t(θ)y(R) − p(θ)t(θ)θ .




















˜ θ2 d˜ θ
⎞





























˜ θ2 d˜ θ ,
from which (29) is derived. Integrate it to obtain (25).
P r o o fo fC o r o l l a r y3 .Take a given θ and ε > 0.W eh a v e˙ t(θt)=
t(θ+ε)−t(θ)
ε
for some θt ∈ [θ,θ + ε], from which we can write ε =
t(θ+ε)−t(θ)
˙ t(θt) and ˙ TF (θT)=
TF(θ+ε)−TF(θ)
ε for some θT ∈ [θ,θ + ε],t h a ti s
˙ TF (θT)=
TF (θ + ε) − TF (θ)





The second equality is (31). Take the limit ε → 0, which implies (θt − θT) → 0







with a slight abuse of notation. The LHS is decreasing in θ and therefore in t,
which shows that the slope of the curve in the north-east quadrant is decreasing,
establishing the Corollary.
Proof of Proposition 5. Impose δ =0in the proof of Proposition 4. This
eliminates the constraint given by the information disadvantage of the govern-
ment. (A9) becomes:
−β (θ) − (1 + λ)f (θ)=0.( A 2 4 )














− ρf (θ)=0 for r ∈ (0,r max) ;






− ρf (θ) > 0 .
Using (A24), this implies that








A8That is, the solution is “bang-bang”. (A10) becomes
−t(θ)f (θ) − β (θ)t(θ) − τ (θ)=0,
τ (θ)=λf (θ)t(θ) ,
as before. (A18) in turn becomes:
z λ
1+λ




and the last university active is given by the solution in θ of




The multipliers ρ is still given by (A19), and substituting the value of ρ into
the above, the Proposition is obtained.
Proof of Proposition 6. From the Lagrangean L,w i t hβ and τ the multipliers












































y0 (r) − β
y(r)
θ
.( A 2 8 )
Note that, by the indiﬀerence condition (39), U (y(r) − p − a − g)=U (y(r) − g),













Deﬁne u(t) to be the expression at the denominator of (40), so the integral in
(A26)-(A28) is u(t)t. Setting the ﬁrst order conditions to 0, and rearrange to
A9get:
β = u(t)t +( 1− t)U0 (·) ,( A 2 9 )
τ = βt − u(t)t = t(1 − t)
¡





(1 − t)(U0 (·) − u(t))








This corresponds to (34): notice that the left hand side is the function z with
k =
(1 − t)(U0 (·) − u(t))
u(t)t +( 1− t)U0 (·)
.








U0 (·) − u(t)
u(t)
.
This establishes the Proposition.
A10